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THE CURIOUS, PERJURIOUS REQUIREMENTS OF 
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 12(B)(3) 
Wm. Dennis Huber* 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
A 2010 survey of Illinois Civil Procedure discussed recent amendments 
to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules that apply to civil practice issues.1  The 
survey began with Notices of Appeal and a substantial part of the survey of 
Notices of Appeal was devoted to Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers 
Insurance Co.2  The purpose of this Article is to examine in greater depth the 
requirements of filing notices of appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
12(b)(3) and the corresponding proof of service of Rule 373. 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) has what can only be called 
“curious, perjurious requirements.”  They are curious because, in conjunction 
with Rule 373, they require an affiant to state under penalty of perjury that 
he or she has personal knowledge of events that have not yet occurred.  They 
are perjurious because they require the affiants to state under oath or penalty 
of perjury that they already performed an act when in fact they did not and 
could not have performed at the time the affidavit was executed.  The rule in 
essence states “unless you swear you performed an act that you did not 
actually perform your case will not be heard by the court.” 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) states,  
(b) Manner of Proof. Service is proved:   
(3) in case of service by mail or by delivery to a third-party commercial 
carrier, by certificate of the attorney, or affidavit of a person other than the 
attorney, who deposited the document in the mail or delivered the document 
to a third-party commercial carrier, stating the time and place of mailing or 
delivery, the complete address which appeared on the envelope or package, 
and the fact that proper postage or the delivery charge was prepaid . . . .3 
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1. Timothy J. Chorvat & Christine P. Benavente, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure, 34 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 807 (2010).  
2. Id. at 814–17; Secura Ins. Co. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 902 N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 2009).  
3. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 12(b). 
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Rule 12(b)(3) must be read in conjunction with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
373, which states   
Unless received after the due date, the time of filing records, briefs or other 
papers required to be filed within a specified time will be the date on which 
they are actually received by the clerk of the reviewing court.  If received 
after the due date, the time of mailing, or the time of delivery to a third-
party commercial carrier for delivery to the clerk within three business days, 
shall be deemed the time of filing.  Proof of mailing or delivery to a third-
party commercial carrier shall be as provided in Rule 12(b)(3).  This rule 
also applies to a motion directed against the judgment and to the notice of 
appeal filed in the trial court.4      
Rule 373 was revised to its present form to allow proof of service by 
affidavit as a result of problems with either illegible or missing postmarks.5 
Rule 373 was enacted in 1967.  The Rule’s purpose is to “make it unnecessary 
for counsel to make sure that briefs and other papers mailed before the filing 
date actually reach the reviewing court within the time limit.”6  If the clerk’s 
office receives the paper “a day or two” after the filing date, a court will not 
prohibit an appeal.7  The original rule “provided that the time of mailing 
might be evidenced by the postmark affixed by a United States Post Office.”8 
“Because of problems with the legibility of postmarks, and delay in affixing 
them in some cases, the rule was amended in 1981 to provide for the use of 
affidavits of mailing or United States Postal Service certificates of mailing”9 
In 1985, the rule was amended to allow for filing date recordings in an 
attempt to simplify record keeping in the appellate and supreme courts.10  
In order to show the curious, perjurious requirements of Rule 12(b)(3), 
several factors must first be considered separately: the Rule itself, the nature 
of affidavits, and the meaning of perjury.  When combined, it is clear that, 
although an affidavit is a “simple” piece of paper, the Rule, as discussed 
infra, is tantamount to requiring an affiant to commit perjury.  
Part II of this Article will review recent Rule 12(b)(3) cases in the courts 
and is discussed in conjunction with Rule 373.  Part III will discuss the legal 
requirements of affidavits followed by a discussion of the nature of perjury 
and rules of statutory construction.  Part IV considers the abuse and misuse 
                                                                                                                           
4. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 373.  
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of Rule 12(b)(3).  Last, Part V presents conclusions and recommendations to 
resolve the contradictions and inconsistencies associated with Rule 12(b)(3).   
II.  HISTORY OF ILLINOIS RULE 12(B)(3) IN THE COURTS FROM 
2009 TO 2014 
A.  Rule 12(b)(3) in the Illinois Supreme Court 
A comprehensive Westlaw search on September 30, 2014, turned up 
more than sixty reported cases, of which half of the Appellate Court opinions 
were marked “UNPUBLISHED OPINION.  CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court 
Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited 
circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).”11 
In 2009, the Illinois Supreme Court issued what most district appellate 
courts considered a strict interpretation of Rule 12(b)(3).12  A detailed 
analysis of that case is therefore necessary.  In Secura Insurance Co. v. 
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment 
action against Illinois Farmers Insurance Company and both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment.13  
“The trial court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment and 
denied Secura’s motion for summary judgment.”14  Secura then moved for 
reconsideration of the trial court’s order, which was denied on May 17, 
2006.15  Secura filed a notice of appeal but failed to include an affidavit of 
service stating the date and time of mailing.16  The appellate court denied 
Farmers’ motion to dismiss for failure to timely file the notice of appeal 
because the court did not receive Secura’s notice of appeal until June 20, 
2006.17  Farmers filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                           
11. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(e)(1).  The Rule provides,  
(e) Effect of Orders.  (1) An order entered under subpart (b) or (c) of this rule is not 
precedential and may not be cited by any party except to support contentions of double 
jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.  When cited for these 
purposes, a copy of the order shall be furnished to all other counsel and the court.  (2) 
An order entered under subpart (b) of this rule must contain on its first page a notice in 
substantially the following form: NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court 
Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited 
circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 
 Id.  
12. See Chorvat & Benavente, supra note 1, at 817.  
13. 902 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 2009). 
14. Id. at 664. 
15. Id.  
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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because no affidavit of service was filed, and the appellate court initially 
granted this appeal.18  
After the appeal was dismissed Secura moved for leave to respond and 
to rehear Farmers’ motion to dismiss, which the court granted.19  On 
rehearing, the appellate court vacated its order dismissing the appeal and 
allowed Secura to supplement the record with a letter that had been sent to 
the circuit court dated June 16, 2006.20  The appellate court denied Farmers’ 
motion to dismiss the appeal and ruled that the court was not deprived of 
jurisdiction, that the failure to comply by filing an affidavit of service was a 
“harmless error,” and there was no showing of prejudice to Farmers.21  
Farmers appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal is both “jurisdictional and mandatory”22 
and according to Rule 303(a)(1),23 Secura’s notice of appeal was due within 
thirty days—June 16th—following the order granting summary judgment.24 
Since there was no dispute that the appellate court did not receive the notice 
of appeal within thirty days, Rule 373 required the court to consider Rule 
12(b)(3).  The court stated that  
while Rule 373 relaxes the requirement of timely filing where a party takes 
advantage of the convenience of mailing a document, a party can only take 
advantage of Rule 373 if it files proper proof of mailing as required by Rule 
12(b)(3).  The reason for such a requirement is elementary.  If there is no 
proof of mailing on file, there is nothing in the record to establish the date 
the document was timely mailed to confer jurisdiction on the appellate 
court.25 
Farmers argued that the cover letter submitted by Secura to supplement 
the record was not adequate proof of service, while Secura argued that the 
cover letter was sufficient to comply with Rule 12(b)(3).26  However, the 
Supreme Court held that the cover letter  
does not provide ‘proof of mailing’ such that it is competent evidence under 
the rule.  The letter does not contain an affidavit or a certificate and nothing 
is certified or sworn to.  The cover letter contains only a date, which, at best, 
indicates that it may have been mailed on that date.  This is simply 
                                                                                                                           
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id.  
22. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 303(a)(1). 
23. Secura Ins. Co., 902 N.E.2d at 666. 
24. Id. at 665. 
25. Id. at 666 (citations omitted).  
26. Id. at 665–66. 
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insufficient for purposes of the rule.  Indeed, the record, having been 
supplemented with the cover letter, offers no more certainty concerning the 
timeliness of the notice than it did before the cover letter became part of the 
record.27 
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court lacked 
jurisdiction and stated that the appeal should have been dismissed.28  The 
court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and dismissed the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.29 
In its ruling the Supreme Court stated, “[T]his court has general 
supervisory authority to oversee the administration of its own rules in the 
statewide system of courts.”30 This statement takes on greater significance in 
cases where rules of statutory construction are applied to interpreting 
Supreme Court rules.31  
In considering the requirement of filing an affidavit of service, what the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Secura did not say is as important as what it did 
say. The court said that “there is nothing in the record to establish the date 
the document was timely mailed to confer jurisdiction on the appellate 
court.”32 The court did not say whether there could be other, competent 
evidence in the record other than an affidavit of service that could establish 
the date a notice of appeal was timely mailed in order to confer jurisdiction 
on the appellate court.   
The following section reviews relevant cases from each appellate 
district on a district-by-district basis. 
B.  Rule 12(b)(3) in the Appellate Courts 
There is a split among the districts on how to interpret Rule 12(b)(3). 
However, due to the large number of cases, only a few representative cases 
can be reviewed here.  Many of the 12(b)(3) cases arose from incarcerated 
persons fling pro se appeals.  
1.  First District 
In People v. Makiel the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal from 
orders dismissing his petition for relief from the judgment and a motion for 
                                                                                                                           
27. Id. at 666 (emphasis added). 
28. Id. at 667.  
29. Id.  
30. Id.  
31. See infra Part III.B. 
32. Secura Ins. Co., 902 N.E.2d at 666. 
456 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 39 
 
re-sentencing.33  The trial court entered its orders on October 16, 2009.34  The 
defendant filed his notice of appeal on November 23, 2009, the date it was 
stamped, which was eight days after the due date.35  The defendant argued 
that the notice of appeal was timely mailed and supplemented the record with 
a photocopy of the envelope that was postmarked November 5, 2009.36  The 
front of the envelope was dated November 23, 2009, but the back of the 
envelope was stamped November 9, 2009.37  
The First District ruled that Makiel did not timely mail his notice of 
appeal because he did not file an affidavit of service.38  The court cited Secura 
and People v. Tlatenchi in which the appellants relied on the “date of 
mailing” rule to establish the date of mailing, which was rejected by the 
court.39  
The court also relied on People v. Lugo in which the majority held that 
proof of mailing must be by certificate or affidavit of mailing, and since a 
postmark is neither, it is insufficient proof of mailing.40  However, a dissent 
in the Lugo ruling disagreed with the reasoning of the majority that since a 
postmark is neither a certificate nor affidavit, it is not competent evidence of 
proof of mailing.41  
Importantly, the First District discussed at length a Second District case, 
People v. Hansen, that adopted the minority dissent in Lugo and held that the 
postmark on an envelope containing the notice of appeal was sufficient to 
establish the date the appeal was mailed for purposes of the date of mailing 
rule where the postmark was legible.42  However, the First District noted that 
the Hansen ruling departed from the Lugo majority and found that Hansen 
provided no basis for departing from Tlatenchi.43 
 
  
                                                                                                                           
33. 2012 IL App (1st) 093430-U, ¶ 2, appeal denied, and vacated, 978 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. 2012). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. ¶ 6.  
36. Id. ¶ 12. 
37. Id.  
38. Id. ¶ 17.  
39. Id.; see also People v. Tlatenchi, 909 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
40. Id.; see also People v. Lugo, 910 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  
41. Lugo, 910 N.E.2d at 774 (McLaren, J., dissenting).  The dissent in Lugo is discussed in greater 
detail in infra Part III.B. 
42. Makiel, 2012 IL App (1st) 093430-U, ¶ 18; see also People v. Hansen, 952 N.E.2d 82, 86–87 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011). 
43. Makiel, 2012 IL App (1st) 093430-U, ¶ 18. 
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2.  Second District 
In People v. Lugo the defendant was indicted on three counts of 
solicitation of murder for hire.44  The “defendant pleaded guilty to count I, 
and the trial court granted the State’s motion.”45  The trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced him to twenty 
years in prison.46  The trial court dismissed the defendant’s post-conviction 
petition, and the defendant appealed.47 
The defendant’s notice of appeal was stamped March 15, 2007, but an 
envelope which was taped to the back of the notice of appeal was postmarked 
March 2, 2007.48  The envelope was not file-stamped and no affidavit of 
service of the notice of appeal was included in the record on appeal.49 
The notice of appeal was due March 4, 2007, (March 5 because March 
4 was a Sunday) but was stamped March 15, 2007, ten days late.50 The court 
noted that if the postmark of March 2, 2007, was sufficient proof of timely 
mailing then the defendant’s notice of appeal was filed within thirty days.51 
To determine whether the postmark serves as proof of mailing under Rule 
373 the court considered what it believed to be the intent of the drafters of 
the rule. The court reasoned that  
[U]nder the plain language of Rule 373, proof of mailing must be as 
provided in Rule 12(b)(3).  Rule 12(b)(3) provides that proof is by 
certificate or affidavit of mailing.  It does not provide for proof in any other 
form.  Thus, the language of Rule 373 is in providing that proof of mailing 
must be by certificate or affidavit of mailing.  Accordingly, if proof of 
mailing must be by certificate or affidavit of mailing, then it cannot be by 
postmark, as a postmark is neither a certificate nor an affidavit of mailing.52    
The court inferred that the Supreme Court of Illinois removed from 
Rule 373 language that specifically allowed postmarks to serve as proof of 
mailing.53  The court noted that the 1967 version of Rule 373 provided,  
The time of mailing, which may be evidenced by a post mark affixed in and 
by a United States Post Office, shall be deemed the time of filing the record 
                                                                                                                           
44. 910 N.E.2d 767, 768 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id.  
48. Id.  
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 769. 
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 770. 
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on appeal, any brief, excerpts from record, or any other paper required to 
be filed in a reviewing court within a specified time.54  
The court further reasoned that a 1981 amendment to Rule 373 no 
longer provided for proof of mailing by a postmark55 but instead required a 
“certificate of the attorney, or affidavit from the person who deposited the 
paper in the mail stating the date and place of mailing and the fact that proper 
postage was prepaid, or a United States Postal Service certificate of 
mailing.”56  The court cited the Committee Comments that explained the 
change: 
As originally adopted the rule provided that the time of mailing might be 
evidenced by the post mark affixed by a United States Post Office.  Because 
of problems with the legibility of post marks, and delay in affixing them in 
some cases, the rule was amended in 1981 to provide for the use of 
affidavits of mailing [or] United States Postal Service certificates of 
mailing.57    
The court concluded that the supreme court chose to eliminate 
postmarks as proofs of service by requiring that proof of mailing be in the 
form of a certificate or affidavit of mailing, as provided in Rule 12(b)(3).58 
The court believed, contrary to the dissent, that the amendments to Rule 373 
indicated an intent on the part of the rule’s drafters to narrow the permissible 
forms of proof of mailing by changing the word from “may be evidenced by 
a post mark affixed in and by a United States Post Office” to “shall be” in the 
form of a certificate or affidavit of mailing.59   
Importantly the court noted that, as pointed out by the dissent, there was 
no issue of postmarks in Secura, and, thus, Secura was a different factual 
situation.60  Nevertheless, the court did not agree that the absence of 
postmarks in Secura did not support the court’s decision because “the 
requirements of Rule 373 do not turn on whether the case involves a cover 
letter or a postmark, we do not believe that the fact Secura involved a cover 
letter while the present case involves a postmark diminishes the relevance of 
Secura to our decision.”61  
  
                                                                                                                           
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 771. 
56. Id. (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 373). 
57. Id. at 770 (quoting ILL. SUP. CT. R. 373, COMMITTEE COMMENTS (1985)). 
58. Id.  
59. Id. at 771. 
60. Id. at 772. 
61. Id.  
2015]  Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) 459 
 
 
 
 
The court determined that the language of Rule 373 was  
unambiguous in requiring, by reference to Rule 12(b)(3), proof of mailing 
of a notice of appeal by certificate or affidavit of mailing.  A postmark is 
not a certificate or affidavit of mailing and has been specifically rejected by 
the drafters of Rule 373 as an acceptable form of proof of mailing . . . we 
do not believe that the reliability of postmarks has any bearing on the 
question of what constitutes sufficient proof of mailing under Rule 373.  
Our decision is not based on a determination of what form of proof of 
mailing is most reliable, but instead is based on the language of Rule 373. 
Where the supreme court has chosen to require a certificate or affidavit of 
mailing instead of the dissent's arguably more reliable postmark, we are not 
in a position to disregard that decision.62  
Justice McLaren dissented, believing that the majority read Rule 
12(b)(3) too literally and narrowly.63  The dissent stated that, “The paramount 
rule of our interpretation is to glean the intent of Rule 12(b)(3) and then 
follow it.”64  The dissent observed that the comments are silent as to whether 
it was the drafters’ intent to abandon the postmark as competent proof of 
mailing.65  
The dissent applied a syllogistic argument: “[B]efore a postmark can be 
stamped on an envelope, the envelope [containing the affidavit] must [then] 
be placed in the mail.  If the postmark is timely, then it is immaterial when 
the envelope was actually placed in the mail.”66  Thus, the dissent recognized 
that the affidavit of service must be executed prior to placing it in the mail, 
but did not realize the importance of the sequence, namely, it is impossible 
to know with certainty ahead of time when the notice of appeal would 
actually be placed in the mail.  
The dissent went on to state, 
It defies the purpose of the mailbox rule to conclude that a certificate or 
affidavit must be the only means to establish a timely mailing.  For the 
majority to conclude that the rule will not entertain such a syllogistic proof 
is to determine that equivocal silence is an explicit negation of the pro-
mailing policy of Rule 12(b)(3) and the mailbox rule.  If, as determined by 
the majority, everything that is not specifically allowed is proscribed 
because it is “specifically rejected,” then several prior cases interpreting 
Rule 12(b)(3) are incorrect and the affidavit must be executed by staff, and 
                                                                                                                           
62. Id. (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at 774 (McLaren, J., dissenting). 
64. Id.  
65. Id. at 775. 
66. Id. at 777. 
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an attempted subsequent filing of the proof of mailing is incompetent 
despite what Secura states.67 
The dissent reviewed the history of Rule 12(b)(3) and stated,  
A fair reading of the history of the rules and their amendments indicates a 
consistent broadening of the application of the mailbox rule in order to give 
the mailer the greatest benefit. The fact that the rule has eased the procedure 
for establishing compliance with the mailbox rule does not mean that there 
has been an affirmative statement that otherwise competent proof of mailing 
is no longer competent.68 
Notably, while Judge McLaren wrote the dissent in the Lugo case that 
rejected a postmark as proof of mailing, he wrote the majority opinion in 
People v. Hansen in which he adopted his dissent in Lugo just two years 
earlier.69  Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment.70  The supreme court 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and the defendant sought 
pro se post-conviction relief.71  
On September 23, 2008, the trial court dismissed the petition.72  The 
defendant then moved the trial court to reconsider its ruling but on November 
5, 2008, the court denied the motion to reconsider.73  The court’s written 
order was dated November 5, 2008, but not stamped until November 10, 
2008, and was not delivered to the defendant until November 19, 2008.74  The 
defendant then filed a notice of appeal.75  The affidavit of service stated that 
the notice of appeal was placed in the prison’s mail system on December 8, 
2008.76  The State argued that the court was without jurisdiction over the 
appeal because the defendant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.77  
In considering whether Secura applied, the court noted that the only 
evidence of the date of mailing submitted in Secura was the date contained 
in the body of a cover letter.78  However, there was something in the record 
on appeal that established the date of mailing of Hansen’s appeal— “a clear 
postmark of ‘Dec 10 2008’ on the envelope in which the notice of appeal was 
                                                                                                                           
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 778. 
69. 952 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
70. Id. at 84. 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. Id.  
74. Id.  
75. Id.  
76. Id.  
77. Id.  
78. Id. at 86. 
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mailed.”79  The court reviewed the majority decision in Lugo made just two 
years earlier but rejected it in favor of the dissent.80   
We conclude, as did the dissent in Lugo, that Lugo is too literal and narrow 
in its reading and interpretation of Rules 373 and 12(b)(3) . . . It is axiomatic 
that, if there is a timely and legible postmark, an affidavit or a certification 
of mailing is a corroborative redundancy.  Requiring a court to overlook a 
clearly legible postmark showing that a document was processed by a 
disinterested third party, such as the post office, on or before the date by 
which the document was required to be mailed is to disregard the best, most 
competent evidence of the latest date of mailing consistent with the “pro-
mailing policy of Rule 373.”81     
The majority then concluded that a clearly legible postmark is sufficient 
proof of mailing under Rule 373, and therefore, the defendant’s notice of 
appeal was timely filed.82  However, in a reversal of roles, the dissent in 
Hansen sided with the majority in Lugo revealing not only a sharp division 
between the districts, but also how a final judgment depends on the whim of 
the courts.83 
3.  Fourth District  
In People v. Davis the defendant pleaded guilty in August 2010, to two 
counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.84  On October 5, 2010, 
the trial court sentenced her to two concurrent five-year prison terms.85  Since 
the defendant was sentenced on October 5, 2010, she had until November 4, 
2010, to file a motion to withdraw her plea or file a motion to reconsider the 
sentence, but her pro se letter was file-stamped by the clerk of the court on 
November 22, 2010, which was beyond the thirty-day deadline.86 
The court cited People v. Tlatenchi where it was held that an 
incarcerated defendant’s appeal is “considered timely filed if it is placed in 
the prison mail system within the 30-day period, regardless of the date on 
which the motion is received or file-stamped.”87  Although the proof of 
service was dated November 3, 2010, it was notarized on November 10, 
2010, after the thirty–day period.88  Therefore, the proof of service did not 
                                                                                                                           
79. Id.  
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 86–87 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
82. Id. at 87. 
83. See id. at 89 (Jorgensen, J., dissenting).  
84. 2011 IL App (4th) 110274-U, ¶ 3.  
85. Id.   
86. Id. ¶ 11. 
87. Id. ¶ 12 (citing People v. Tlatenchi, 909 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)). 
88. Id. ¶ 16. 
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constitute an “affidavit” under Rule 12(b)(3) until it was “sworn to by a party 
before some person who has authority under the law to administer oaths” on 
November 10, 2010.89 
Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the defendant’s motion were excused 
since she was not properly admonished by the trial court regarding the filing 
requirements of a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 605(b).90   
In People v. Smith, in February 2009, the State charged the defendant 
with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol.91 After a June 2009 
bench trial the court found the defendant guilty.92  At a July 2009 hearing the 
court sentenced defendant to twenty years’ imprisonment.93  The defendant 
filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence.94  On August 11, 2009, the 
defendant filed a notice of appeal, which was stamped on September 2, 
2009.95  The defendant also filed an “affidavit of service” that stated, inter 
alia, that he had mailed the motion on August 28, 2009.96  On September 10, 
2009, the court granted the defendant leave to file a late notice of appeal, 
which was filed in the trial court on September 11, 2009.97  On October 23, 
2009, the defendant’s defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial or 
alternatively to reduce the sentence.98  The State argued that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction because it was untimely filed and should therefore be 
dismissed.99  
In deciding whether the motion was timely filed, the court considered 
both Tlatenchi, where a defendant relied upon the date of mailing as the date 
of filing for a post-plea motion, proof of mailing must be as provided by 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3), and Hansen, where a clear, legible 
postmark was sufficient to prove date of mailing.100  The court adopted the 
Tlatenchi requirement that proof of mailing must strictly comply with Rule 
12(b)(3) by including an affidavit of service.101 
In People v. Blalock the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
unlawful use of a weapon by a convicted felon “in exchange for the State’s 
                                                                                                                           
89. Id.  
90. Id. ¶ 19. 
91. 2011 IL App (4th) 100430, ¶ 1, 960 N.E.2d 595, 596, appeal denied, and vacated, 8 N.E.3d 1042 
(Ill. 2014). 
92. Id., 960 N.E.2d at 597. 
93. Id., 960 N.E.2d at 597.  
94. Id., 960 N.E.2d at 597.  
95. Id. ¶ 7, 960 N.E.2d at 597. 
96. Id., 906 N.E.2d at 597.  
97. Id., 906 N.E.2d at 597.  
98. Id. ¶ 8, N.E.2d at 598.  
99. Id. ¶ 11, N.E.2d at 598.  
100. Id. ¶¶ 14–17, 960 N.E.2d at 599–600.   
101. Id. ¶ 17, 960 N.E.2d at 600.  The Supreme Court of Illinois subsequently vacated the judgment 
without comment. People v. Smith, 8 N.E.2d 1042 (Ill. 2014) (order vacating judgment of appellate 
court).  
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dismissal of the second count and a recommendation of a four-year 
sentence.”102  “In November, 2008, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 
30 months’ probation.”103  
The State filed several petitions to revoke the defendant’s probation.104 
In May 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s first petition 
to revoke the defendant’s probation and found the defendant in violation of 
his probation, and the court subsequently resentenced the defendant to four 
years in prison.105  “On August 10, 2010, the defendant filed a pro se motion 
for a reduction of his sentence.”106  After a hearing in December 2010, the 
trial court denied the motion to reconsider and the defendant appealed.107  
The circuit court stamped the defendant’s motion on Tuesday, August 
10, 2010, after the deadline to file the motion.108  The envelope in which the 
defendant mailed his motion, along with a sworn statement that the attached 
motion was true and correct, a notice of filing, and an affidavit of service, all 
on one sheet of paper, which showed a postmark of August 6, 2010.109  The 
only notarization on the one sheet of paper was located at the top of the paper 
and was dated August 5, 2010.110  
The State argued first, that the defendant cited no cases that held that a 
notarization of a sworn statement may also be considered as evidence that 
the affidavit of service was notarized when both are on a single piece of paper 
and more than one set of staple holes are visible on the forms calling into 
question whether the documents were originally mailed together is mere 
speculation.111  The State also argued that the affidavit was insufficient 
because it failed to state “the complete address which appeared on the 
envelope or package” as required by Rule 12(b)(3).112  
The court held that because the defendant failed to comply with Rule 
12(b)(3)’s affidavit requirement the date on which the court clerk stamped it 
is the date it was filed and therefore the motion was untimely.113  It reasoned 
that supreme court rules “have the force of law, and the presumption must be 
that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.”114   
                                                                                                                           
102. Smith, 2011 IL App (4th) 100430, ¶ 17, 976 N.E.2d at 645. 
103. Id., 976 N.E.2d at 645. 
104. Id. ¶ 2, N.E.2d at 645.   
105. Id., N.E.2d at 645.  
106. Id. ¶ 3, N.E.2d at 645.  
107. Id., N.E.2d at 645.  
108. Id. ¶ 7, N.E.2d at 646. 
109. Id., N.E.2d at 646.  
110. Id., N.E.2d at 646.  
111. Id. ¶ 10, N.E.2d at 647.  
112. Id., N.E.2d at 647.  
113. Id. ¶ 11, N.E.2d at 647.  
114. Id., N.E.2d at 647 (citations omitted).  
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5.  Fifth District  
In People v. Kayich, the defendant appealed the dismissal of his motion, 
filed on January 20, 2011, to withdraw his guilty plea, to vacate his sentence, 
and to reduce his sentence.115  The State moved to dismiss the defendant’s 
pro se motions on the grounds they were not timely filed.116  The defendant 
argued that his motions were timely filed because he placed them in the 
prison mailing system on January 10, 2011.117  The circuit court granted the 
State’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s motions.118  
The court was unable to locate any envelope in the record and therefore 
did not address the issue of “whether a pro se incarcerated defendant may 
escape the affidavit requirement of Rule 12(b)(3) by a postmarked 
envelope.”119  The date of filing was January 20, 2011, which was the date it 
was stamped by the court clerk, and the notice of appeal was therefore not 
timely filed.120  
 III.  THE CURIOUS, PERJURIOUS REQUIREMENTS OF ILLINOIS 
RULE 12(B)(3) 
A.  Affidavits, Perjury, and Statutory Construction 
Rule 12(b)(3) requires the filing of an affidavit of service121 “stating the 
time and place of mailing or delivery, the complete address which appeared 
on the envelope or package, and the fact that proper postage or the delivery 
charge was prepaid.”122  What constitutes an affidavit has been considered by 
several courts and therefore it is necessary to consider affidavits in 
conjunction with the required affidavit of service.  
1.  Affidavits 
Supreme Court Rule 191 sets forth the requirements for an affidavit.  An 
affidavit  
                                                                                                                           
115. 2013 IL App (5th) 110245-U, ¶ 4.  
116. Id.  
117. Id.  
118. Id.  
119. Id. ¶ 10. 
120. Id.  
121. An affidavit is required for non-attorneys. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 12(b)(2).  A certificate of service is 
required to be filed by an attorney.  Id.  For purposes of this analysis, they are considered equivalent.  
122. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 12(b)(3).  Curiously, the Rule does not state that the address must be the correct 
address, or even the address on file.  It need only contain the address to where the notice was mailed.    
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(1) shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; 
(2) shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, 
counterclaim, or defense is based; 
(3) shall have attached thereto sworn or certified copies of all documents 
upon which the affiant relies; 
(4) shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and 
(5) shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify 
competently thereto.123 
As ruled by the Illinois Supreme Court in Outboard Marine Corp. v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., “Statements in an affidavit which are based 
on information and belief or which are unsupported conclusions, opinions, or 
speculation are insufficient.”124  Yet, that is exactly what an affidavit of 
service of a notice of appeal contains—speculation regarding a future event.  
Furthermore, the Fourth District has held that affidavits containing self-
serving statements do not comply with Rule 191(a).125  Certainly statements 
in an affidavit of service of a notice of appeal concerning the date and time 
of mailing cannot be considered anything less than self-serving since it 
determines whether an appellate court has jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(3). 
While an affidavit of service contains obviously self-serving statements, 
rather than being rejected, as would an affidavit for any other purpose, it is 
required under Rule 12(b)(3). 
In People v. Saunders the defendant was convicted of murder.126  The 
defendant appealed, and the supreme court affirmed his conviction and 
sentence.127  The defendant then filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act.128  The petition was notarized and dated December 
30, 1991.129  Attached to the petition was a notarized document entitled 
“Proof of Service” which was also dated December 30, 1991, stating that he 
placed the petition in the United States Mail at the Centralia Correctional 
Center on December 30, 1991.130  The court clerk stamped the petition on 
January 9, 1992.131  “On January 28, 1992, the State moved to dismiss the 
petition on the grounds that the petition was filed more than three years after 
the date of defendant’s conviction.”132  The circuit court concluded that the 
                                                                                                                           
123. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 191(a).  See also Steve L. Dellinger, The Art of Motions:  Understanding Illinois 
Civil Pretrial Motions, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 183, 210–13 (2014). 
124. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1223 (Ill. 1992) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
125. See Jones v. Dettro, 720 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
126. 633 N.E.2d 1340, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
127. Id. at 1340–41. 
128. Id. at 1341.  
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.  
132. Id.  
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petition was not timely filed and granted the State’s motion to dismiss and 
the defendant appealed.133 
The defendant included an affidavit of service that stated the petition 
was mailed on December 30, 1991.134  The appellate court allowed the 
defendant to file a late notice of appeal.135  In opposing the proof of service 
the State argued that the court would “encourage and provide an opportunity 
for the falsification of certificates and affidavits.”136  Although the court 
minimized the risk of false affidavits, it did explicitly recognize that the risk 
of false affidavits is in fact present. The court stated, “Where, as here, the 
petitioner is incarcerated and must rely on the incarcerating institution’s 
notary public to verify his documents, the risk of fraud is slight.”137    
In People v. Perkins the First District appellate court stated that, “An 
affiant must have first-hand knowledge of the factual allegations contained 
in the affidavit” and that affidavits should be made on “personal 
knowledge.”138  Importantly, the court explicitly recognized that the filing of 
a false affidavit could give rise to a prosecution for perjury or a court imposed 
sanction for contempt of court.139 
In People v. Poierier the defendant was charged and pled guilty to one 
count of aggravated DUI and one count of aggravated fleeing and eluding.140  
He subsequently moved to withdraw his plea of guilty.141  The trial court 
denied the motion and the defendant appealed.142  The Third District 
Appellate Court did not receive the notice of appeal, but noted that the 
defendant did file a proof of service and notarized affidavit stating the date 
he placed the original motion in the prison mail, and therefore from the record 
the defendant took all the necessary steps to ensure that his motion was timely 
mailed in compliance with Rule 12(b)(3).143  
Notably, although the court accepted the affidavit as proof of timely 
filing, the court cited People v. Saunders, where the court found that “the use 
of the incarcerating institution’s notary public minimizes the risk of false 
affidavits”144 thus again making an explicit recognition that affidavits of 
service have a risk that they may be false.  
                                                                                                                           
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 1343. 
135. Id.  
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
138. 636 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
139. Id. at 782. 
140. 2014 IL App (3d) 120618-U, ¶ 8. 
141. Id. ¶ 9. 
142. Id. ¶ 19. 
143. Id ¶ 32. 
144. Id.; see also People v. Saunders, 633 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  
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In Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., the Illinois Supreme Court 
discussed at length what an affidavit is.  
Illinois courts have defined [affidavit] in consistent fashion for over 100 
years. For example, in Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307, 311 (1875), this court 
noted that “[a]n affidavit is simply a declaration, on oath, in writing, sworn 
to by a party before some person who has authority under the law to 
administer oaths. It does not depend on the fact whether it is entitled in any 
cause or in any particular way. Without any caption whatever, it is 
nevertheless an affidavit . . . More recently, our appellate court has noted 
that “‘[a]n affidavit is simply a declaration, on oath, in writing sworn to 
before some person who has authority under the law to administer oaths. A 
writing which does not appear to have been sworn to before any officer does 
not constitute an affidavit. . . . .Thus, an affidavit must be sworn to, and 
statements in a writing not sworn to before an authorized person cannot be 
considered affidavits [citations omitted].’”145 
However, an affidavit is more than “simply a declaration, on oath, in 
writing, sworn to by a party before some person who has authority under the 
law to administer oaths.”146  Recently, the Fifth District Appellate Court, in 
People v. Schoffner, stated that where an affidavit does not set forth specific 
facts to support that it is based upon personal knowledge, it is insufficient.147 
Furthermore, the dissent in Lugo stated, “The fact that a party claims to have 
placed the paper in the mail does not make it so.”148  The dissent cited Baca 
v. Trejo where the affidavit of service stated it was placed in the United States 
Postal Service (USPS), when it was actually placed in the United Parcel 
Service (UPS).149  While it was only different by one letter (“S”), it was 
enough to deny a timely filing since the rule for delivering the affidavit to a 
private delivery service such as UPS differs significantly from the rule for 
delivering it to the USPS.150  Thus, whether intentional or not, the affidavit 
was false.151  The question naturally arises, if an affidavit can be false about 
a past event, how is an affidavit not false about an event that has not yet 
occurred? 
Therefore, for a court to accept the sufficiency of an affidavit requires 
a two-step process.  First, an affidavit must be a declaration, on oath, in 
writing, and sworn to by a party before some person who has authority under 
                                                                                                                           
145. Roth v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 782 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ill. 2002).  
146. Id.  
147. 2014 IL App (5th) 120201-U, ¶ 18. 
148. People v. Lugo, 910 N.E.2d 767, 775 n.3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (McLaren, J., dissenting). 
149. Id.; see also Baca v. Trejo, 902 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. 2009). 
150. See Baca, 902 N.E.2d at 1112.   
151. Id. at 1113.  
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the law to administer oaths.152  Second, statements in the affidavit must be 
made on the personal knowledge of the affiant, and not based on speculation 
or be self-serving.153  
It hardly needs to be said that no one has personal knowledge of an act 
that he or she has not yet performed, and no one has personal knowledge of 
actions that take place in the future.  Yet, in spite of this, an affidavit of 
service requires an affiant to swear to something about which he or she can 
have no personal knowledge (since it takes place in the future) and that he or 
she has not performed.  It is nothing more than speculation about a future 
event or a statement of intent about an act to be performed in the future.  
2.  Perjury 
An affidavit can be a basis for a perjury charge,154 and in Illinois perjury 
is a Class 3 felony.155  “A person commits perjury when, under oath or 
affirmation, in a proceeding or in any other matter where by law the oath or 
affirmation is required, he or she makes a false statement, material to the 
issue or point in question, knowing the statement is false”156  In People v. 
Perkins, the First District explicitly recognized that the filing of a false 
affidavit could give rise to a prosecution for perjury or a court imposed 
sanction for contempt of court.157 
An affidavit of service is required by law.  The affiant knows that the 
statement is false at the time of executing the affidavit because he or she has 
not performed the act sworn to in the affidavit at the time of executing the 
affidavit.  The time of filing a notice of appeal is clearly material to the issue 
or point in question since it determines the jurisdiction of an appellate court 
to hear an appeal.  Thus, all the elements of perjury are met in the execution 
and filing of an affidavit of service. 
3.  Statutory Construction  
The rules of statutory construction, as described by the appellate court 
in Mason v. John Boos & Co., are 
In determining what the intent is, the court may properly consider not only 
the language used in a statute but also the reason and necessity for the law, 
the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be achieved.  In 
                                                                                                                           
152. Roth v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 782 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ill. 2002). 
153. Jones v. Dettro, 720 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
154. See People v. Mason, 376 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (Ill App. Ct. 1978). 
155. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-2(e) (2014). 
156. Id. § 5/32-2 (emphasis added). 
157. 636 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
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construing a statute, the court must assume that the legislature did not intend 
an absurd result.158   
The Illinois Supreme Court had previously explained the rules of 
statutory construction in Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District,  
Where language of statute admits of two constructions, one of which would 
make enactment absurd and illogical, while the other renders it reasonable 
and sensible, construction which leads to absurd result must be avoided 
[citations omitted].  Proper interpretation of provision cannot simply be 
based on its language; it must be grounded on nature, objects and 
consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.159 
A 2002 Illinois Supreme Court case also considered statutory 
construction.  In Robidoux v. Oliphant the court explained the application of 
statutory construction applicable to Supreme Court Rules.160 
It is well settled that the construction of our rules is comparable to this 
court’s construction of statutes.  The committee comments to Supreme 
Court Rule 2 state that ‘the same principles that govern the construction of 
statutes are applicable to the rules’…[citation omitted] (supreme court rules 
are neither aspirational nor are they suggestions; ‘[t]hey have the force of 
law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as 
written’).  As is the case with statutes, our primary task in construing a rule 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its drafters.161  
Applying the rules of statutory construction to Supreme Court Rule 
12(b)(3), and comparing the rules of statutory construction to how both the 
Supreme Court and appellate courts actually construct Supreme Court rules, 
reveals a glaring inconsistency.  On the one hand, Supreme Court rules “are 
unambiguous”162 and “the same principles that govern the construction of 
statutes are applicable to the rules.”163  On the other hand, the Supreme Court 
has ignored its own rulemaking procedures which demonstrates not only that 
Rule (12)(b)(3) is ambiguous but also rules of statutory construction cannot 
easily be applied to determining the judicial intent of Rule 12(b)(3). 
Notwithstanding assertions that Supreme Court rules are unambiguous and 
                                                                                                                           
158. 2011 IL App (5th), ¶ 6, 959 N.E.2d 209, 212 (citations omitted). 
159. 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988). 
160. See 775 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 2002). 
161. Id. at 992 (citations omitted). 
162. People v. Lugo, 910 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  
163. Robidoux, 775 N.E.2d at 992 (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 2, COMMITTEE COMMENTS). 
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have the force of law both the supreme court and appellate courts have carved 
out exceptions to Rule 12(b)(3).164   
Supreme Court rules are made through formal rulemaking procedures 
as set forth by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 3. 
(1) These procedures are adopted to provide for the orderly and timely 
review of proposed rules and proposed amendments to existing rules of the 
Supreme Court; to provide an opportunity for comments and suggestions 
by the public, the bench, and the bar; to aid the Supreme Court in 
discharging its rulemaking responsibilities; to make a public record of all 
such proposals; and to provide for public access to an annual report 
concerning such proposals.  
(2) The Supreme Court reserves the prerogative of departing from the 
procedures of this rule.  An order of the Supreme Court adopting any rule 
or amendment shall constitute an order modifying these procedures to the 
extent, if any, they have not been complied with in respect to that 
proposal.165 
According to Rule 3(a)(2), the only way to adopt, modify, or amend a 
rule other than by the formal rulemaking procedure of 3(a)(1) is by an order 
of the Illinois Supreme Court departing from the procedures of the Rule. 
While the Illinois Supreme Court has stated it has “general supervisory 
authority to oversee the administration of its own rules in the statewide 
system of courts,”166 by Rule 3(a)(2) its “supervisory authority” does not 
encompass making exceptions to rules outside of Rule 3 Rulemaking 
Procedures.  
Prior to September 19, 2014, when the court revised Rule 12(b)167 the 
court had issued no order making an exception to Rule 12(b)(3) with respect 
to affidavits of service for incarcerated persons. Yet, as previously noted, 
prior to the 2014 revision exceptions were made in several cases for 
incarcerated persons168 outside of the rulemaking procedures, and the 
revision was adopted to incorporate the previous exceptions into the Rule, 
thus recognizing that compliance with the Rule is problematic.  
If rules of statutory construction were to be strictly applied in 
determining the judicial intent of Rules 12(b)(3) and 373, then Rules 12(b)(3) 
and 373 must be informed by both Rule 191, which governs the content of 
affidavits and the definition of perjury.  An affidavit of service under Rules 
                                                                                                                           
164. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 2011 IL App (4th) 110274-U; People v. Saunders, 633 N.E.2d 1340 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1994); People v. Perkins, 636 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
165. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3(a)(1)-(2). 
166. Secura Ins. Co. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 902 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ill. 2009). 
167. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 12(b)(4). 
168. See, e.g., Davis, 2011 IL App (4th) 110274-U; Saunders, 633 N.E.2d 1340; Perkins, 636 N.E.2d 
780. 
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12(b)(3) and 373 could therefore not be accepted as proof of service since it 
does not comply with Rule 191.  As the Illinois Supreme Court previously 
explained in Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District,  
Where language of statute admits of two constructions, one of which would 
make enactment absurd and illogical, while the other renders it reasonable 
and sensible, construction which leads to absurd result must be avoided 
[citations omitted].  Proper interpretation of provision cannot simply be 
based on its language; it must be grounded on nature, objects and 
consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.169 
IV.  THE USE, MISUSE, AND ABUSE OF RULE 12(B)(3) 
 Rule 12(b)(3) is not as unambiguous as portrayed by the courts.  The 
inherent contradiction of Rules 12(b)(3), 191, and 373 renders an affidavit of 
service devoid of any legal meaning since it is “absurd and illogical” and 
leads to an “absurd result.”  It is an open invitation for the misuse and abuse 
of Rule 12(b)(3). 
To be accepted by a court, an affidavit must be made on the basis of 
personal knowledge.  If an affiant does not have personal knowledge about 
the contents of the affidavit, the affidavit is false and cannot be accepted by 
a court.  Therefore, an affidavit of service should not be accepted by a court 
since it is speculation about a future event and is not based on personal 
knowledge.  But, not only is an affidavit of service accepted, it is required 
and tantamount to a court imposed requirement for an appellant to commit 
perjury.  Such uneven and inconsistent approaches to the interpretation of 
judicial intent and the enforcement of Rule 12(b)(3) portray an image of rule 
by caprice. 
This opens the door for the misuse and abuse of Rule 12(b)(3).  The 
solution for missing or illegible postmarks may be worse than the problem, 
since it is equivalent to a requirement to commit perjury.  
In People v. Saunders the court discussed the possibility of false 
affidavits.170 
The State claims that, by following Johnson we would encourage and 
provide an opportunity for the falsification of certificates and affidavits. 
Although the court minimized the risk of false affidavits, it did recognize 
that the risk of false affidavits is present.  “Where, as here, the petitioner is 
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incarcerated and must rely on the incarcerating institution’s notary public 
to verify his documents, the risk of fraud is slight.”171  
The dissent in Lugo observed that  
a defendant’s affidavit would suffice even though he did not actually place 
the paper in the mail.  If the rule can be interpreted in such a way when it is 
silent as to allowing an affidavit from a person who did not actually place 
the paper in the mail, then it would seem that my interpretation concerning 
the inclusion of a timely legible postmark as proof of mailing is reasonable 
as well.172   
While the risk of fraud by an incarcerated person may be slight it is 
present, and the risk of fraud by a non-incarcerated person is significantly 
higher.  The sequence of complying with Rule 12(b)(3) requires the affiant 
to execute an affidavit of service stating the date the notice was mailed.  Then 
the affiant must place the notice and the affidavit in an envelope. Then the 
affiant must go to the post office.  Then, the affiant must apply postage to the 
envelope.  Then, the affiant must either place the envelope in a mailbox or 
deliver the envelope to the postal clerk in order for the envelope to be 
postmarked. 
Due to the logical impossibility of the sequence of complying with the 
Rule, manipulating and circumventing the rule is easily accomplished.  It is 
easy, e.g., for an appellant to notarize an affidavit of service stating the notice 
of appeal was placed in the mail by the deadline, but then not actually place 
it in the mail until one, two, or three weeks after the deadline, thereby 
disadvantaging the opposing party.  The postmark would clearly prove that 
contrary to the affidavit the notice was not mailed prior to the deadline.  Yet, 
the postmark would be disregarded and the self-serving affidavit would 
prevail.173 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDTIONS 
Although Rule 12(b) was revised recently to address the difficulties of 
incarcerated pro se appellants in executing an affidavit,174 the curious, 
                                                                                                                           
171. Id. at 1342 (citations omitted). 
172. People v. Lugo, 910 N.E.2d 767, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (McLaren, J., dissenting). 
173. It is unknown how many times this may have already occurred. 
174. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 12(b)(4).  The Committee Comments state,  
The rules on service and filing have been revised to provide for sending documents via 
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or with a UPS or FedEx contractor. 
 Id., COMMITTEE COMMENTS. 
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perjurious requirements of the Rule remain.  There are several alternatives 
that can remedy the contradictions and inconsistencies associated with the 
current affidavit of proof of service of Rule 12(b)(3). Three such alternatives 
are: 
1.  Use a “highest and best evidence” rule (similar to the best evidence rule 
in litigation), which would accept either a postmark if it is present, or an 
affidavit of service if a postmark were missing or illegible.175 
2.  Use the earlier of either an affidavit of service or a legible postmark to 
prove date of mailing. 
3.  Require the filing an affidavit of service within, e.g., forty-eight hours 
after service.   
Unless and until Rule 12(b)(3) is revised, Illinois courts can expect to see a 
manipulation of the Rule by parties attempting to place the opposing party at 
a disadvantage.   
                                                                                                                           
175. See Lugo, 910 N.E.2d 767 (McLaren, J., dissenting); People v. Hansen, 952 N.E.2d 82, 86–87 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011). 

